Holding: A plaintiff must have a commercial interest to bring an opposition to the registration of a trademark for being descriptive or generic, merely being a consumer is not sufficient to confer standing. However, there is no blanket requirement that a commercial interest is required for standing under every portion of the Lanham Act, each cause of action must be evaluated individually to determine the protected interest.
Ms. Curtin filed an opposition under 15 U.S.C. § 1063 to United Trademark Holdings’ (“UTH”) registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures as being descriptive, generic, and failing to function as a trademark. Ms. Curtin brought the opposition as a consumer and a doll collector and claimed that she and other consumers would be denied access to healthy marketplace competition for other products that represent Rapunzel if UTH’s trademark were to be registered.
The TTAB dismissed Ms. Curtin’s opposition, finding she lacked statutory standing to oppose the registration. The TTAB used the Supreme Court’s zone-of-interests test as described in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) and as applied by the Federal Circuit in Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020) to evaluate whether Ms. Curtin had standing. The TTAB interpreted Corcamore to allow a party to oppose registration of a mark when the opposition is within the zone of interests protected by the statute and when there is a reasonable belief in damage that would be proximately caused by registration of the mark. This analysis led the TTAB to conclude that consumers are generally not statutorily entitled to oppose registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
The Federal Circuit upheld the TTAB’s decision that Ms. Curtin lacked standing, finding that the TTAB correctly applied the Lexmark framework and that Ms. Curtin did not fall within the class of individuals authorized to bring a trademark opposition. Ms. Curtin argued that instead of the Lexmark framework, the TTAB should have followed the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Ritchie stated that the case and controversy restrictions for Article III standing did not apply to matters before administrative agencies and boards. However, Ritchie concerned an opposition of a mark that was comprised of immoral or scandalous matter. Although registration of immoral and scandalous marks was barred at the time, this prohibition was later found to be unconstitutional.
In contrast, in Lexmark, the Supreme Court found that to come within the zone of interests in a suit for false advertising under Section 1125(a), a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. Corcamore extended this requirement to parties seeking cancellation of a mark under Section 1064. Because cancellation under Section 1064 and opposition under Section 1063 are similar processes, the Federal Circuit found the Lexmark framework and the application of Corcamore to control in this case rather than the test outlined in Ritchie.
Under Lexmark, a plaintiff may oppose a trademark when (1) their interests are within the zone of interests protected by the statute and (2) there is a reasonable belief in damage that would be proximately caused by registration of the mark in violation of the opposition statute. The Federal Circuit found that Ms. Curtin satisfied neither of these requirements. The prohibition of marks that are generic or descriptive serves a commercial interest of preventing trademark owners from inhibiting competition on the sale of certain goods and maintaining the freedom of the public to use the generic or descriptive term. Although there may be some benefit to consumers in prohibiting the registration of generic or descriptive marks, these goals may be served by conferring rights that only commercial actors have statutory standing to pursue. Additionally, the Federal Circuit ruled that Ms. Curtin’s potential injuries as a consumer denied access to healthy marketplace competition to be too remote and speculative to confer standing.
Although the Federal Circuit found the zone of interest for challenges of generic or descriptive marks to require a commercial interest, the Federal Circuit found that the zone of interests requirement depends on the language of the particular statute and the particular interests involved. Therefore, the Lanham Act is not subject to a blanket rule that assumes that the intended protected interest is commercial. The protected interest must be evaluated based on the particular ground for the challenge. Some portions of the Lanham Act, such as the prohibition against registration of marks that consist of a flag or a coat of arms is not intended to protect a commercial interest.
Federal Circuit Precedential 
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